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Abstract 
The main purpose of this study is evaluation of the atmospheric transport of pollutants from the 
Vladivostok and Kamchatka nuclear risk sites (NRSs) - nuclear submarines and radioactive storage 
facilities - located at the Russian Far East. The evaluation is given from the probabilistic point of view. 
The main question is: What is the probability for radionuclide atmospheric transport to the neighboring 
countries in the case of an accident at the nuclear risk sites in the Russian Far East?  
To answer this question, we applied two research tools. The first tool is the isentropic 
atmospheric trajectory model to calculate trajectories originating at two NRSs. The second tool is the 
statistical analyses - exploratory, cluster, and probability field analyses - to explore the structure of the 
calculated trajectory data sets seasonally, monthly, and year-to-year. The selected regions of potential 
impact due to atmospheric transport – Japan, China, North and South Koreas, State of Alaska, and 
Aleutian Chain Islands. Additionally, we discussed possible approaches to investigate impacts of the 
radionuclide removal processes during atmospheric transport. 
The main findings of this study are: 
1) For both NRSs: 
• The westerly flow is dominant throughout the year in the boundary layer (more than 60% of the 
time). At altitudes of the free troposphere, the probability of transport from the west increases up 
to 85% of the time.  
• The relatively rapid westerly flow toward the North America reaches maximum occurrence 
during fall-winter (8-11% of the time) and during winter-spring (12-13% of the time) for the 
Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs, respectively.  
 
2) For the Vladivostok NRS:  
• The North China and North Japan regions are at the highest risk of possible impact in 
comparison with other regions. The lower (and upper) bounds of the Vladivostok NRS’s 
possible impact are about of 32 (54) and 35 (87)% for the North China and North Japan regions, 
respectively.  
• On average, atmospheric transport to these regions could occur in 0.5 and 1.6 days, respectively. 
The fast transport events (i.e. in less than 1 day) could represent major concerns for the Japanese 
and North Korean regions, but these are not common for the US territories.  
• Except for the US territories, the boundary layer transport reaches all considered regions more 
than half of time. 
 
3) For the Kamchatka NRS:  
• The US territories are at the highest risk compared to the rest of the regions. The lower (and 
upper) bounds of the Kamchatka NRS’s possible impact are 30 (54) and 13.4 (32.1)% for the 
Aleutian Chain Islands and State of Alaska, respectively.  
• On average, atmospheric transport to these regions could occur in 3.0 and 5.1 days, respectively.  
• The free troposphere transport dominates in the Chinese and North Korean regions, but 
boundary layer transport dominates in other considered regions. 
 
We believe that results of the study are applicable for the emergency response and preparedness 
measures in the cases of the accidental releases at NRSs. Several directions for applicability of results in 
the studies of the consequences for population and environment, risk and vulnerability analysis, social 
and economical aspects resulting from the accidental releases at the nuclear risk sites as well as 
recommendations for the future studies are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Nuclear power, in comparison to other energy sources, remains a compelling 
option in the nearest  future. To have the public as well as political support it must meet 
certain requirements. The nuclear industry has  always faced a public concern. 
Eventually, to  reduce public concern and opposition some important issues must be 
considered. First, control measures to regulate radiation should be taken. Second, 
transparency in the radiation levels reporting should prevail. Third, the possible impact 
from the nuclear objects with respect to the environment and population should be 
evaluated. 
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States (US) and former Soviet 
Union (FSU) were the world’s largest producers of the nuclear related materials, and 
now they are experiencing the largest environmental consequences. As a result of the 
nuclear weapons development, production, and testing, as well as accidents at the 
various nuclear facilities, the radioactively contaminated locations and sites of the 
potential radiation risk had been identified in these countries. Since the late 80s, some 
information about the FSU activities became available and it allowed researchers to gain 
insight on the seriousness of the radiation pollution problems. 
 “The Radiation Safety of the Biosphere” (RAD) Project, started several years 
ago, is focused on the independent evaluation of the currently existing radioactive 
pollution problems and specifically those of the Russian Federation, and in particular, 
its emphasis is on the potential trans-boundary aspects. Research activities of the RAD 
Project are performed through the collaboration and networking between scientists and 
experts from the different organizations and research centers and institutions of the 
MinAtom, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Kurchatov Institute and others. 
During the beginning of the RAD project, the priority was the gaining of an 
overview of the FSU radiation legacy with a focus on Russia (Laverov et al., 1997a; 
Laverov et al., 1997b; Novikov, 1997; Segerstahl et al., 1997; Egorov et al., 2000;). 
Within the frameworks of the RAD project several studies had been performed. Among 
these were  analysis of the Techa River and Lake Karachai, possibly the most 
radioactively contaminated site at the Earth, pollution due to Mayak (Southern Ural, 
Russia) activities (Parker et al., 1999a). Another study evaluated radiological impacts 
of radionuclide releases into the surface waters from two Siberian nuclear complexes: 
the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) and the 
Chemical Combine in Seversk (Tomsk-7) (Waters et al., 1999; Parker et al., 1999b). It 
has been found that contamination is still present in the Tom` and Yenisey Rivers, and it 
can be traced all the way to the Arctic Ocean. The detailed analysis of the results of the 
radioactive wastes injections into the deep geological formations at Krasnoyarsk-26, 
which for a long time raised safety concerns, have  been performed by Parker et al., 
1999c; Compton et al., 2000; Parker et al., 2000; Compton et al., 2001a. 
The first attempts to investigate the radioactive pollution problems in the 
northern territories of Russia, and in particular, for the Russian Northern Fleet (RNF), 
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had been done by Nilsen & Bøhmer, 1994; Baklanov et al., 1996; Bergman et al., 
1996). However, information about existing problems of the Russian Pacific Fleet 
(RPF) is scarce and limited, although recently some data became available (Danilyan et 
al., 2000a; Danilyan et al., 2000b). 
Therefore, the RAD Project (starting from Spring 2000) initiated a new study 
titled: “Assessment of Impact of Russian Nuclear Fleet Operations on Russian Far 
Eastern Coastal Regions” Study (FARECS). The focus of this study is gathering of the 
existing information and analyzing problems associated with the Russian Pacific Fleet 
operations. In 2000, research activities were concentrated on the gathering of available 
information, evaluating data, and preliminary analyses (Takano et al., 2001; Romanova, 
2001). In 2001, the focus was on the analysis of possible danger to the environment and 
population in the neighboring countries due to normal operations and potential 
accidental situations at the nuclear submarines and storage facilities. 
The main purpose of the FARECS study is an attempt to combine atmospheric 
transport modeling and analysis with the radiological assessment in order to evaluate 
consequences of an accident at the nuclear risk sites. The main question we are trying to 
answer in this part of the study is: What is the probability of radionuclide atmospheric 
transport to  adjacent countries in a case of an accident at the nuclear risk sites (NRSs) 
in the Russian Far East (RFE)? The specific objectives are examination of the 
atmospheric transport patterns from the selected NRSs, evaluation of the probability of 
the fast transport (i.e. transport in less than 1 day), and an attempt to select approaches 
to investigate possible impacts of the radionuclide removal processes during 
atmospheric transport. 
In our study, to answer the above mentioned questions we applied the following 
research tools. The atmospheric trajectory model was used to calculate trajectories  
originating over two nuclear risk sites locations in the Russian Far East – Kamchatka 
and Vladivostok. Several statistical analysis tools such as exploratory, cluster, and 
probability field analyses were applied to explore the structure of the trajectory data 
sets. We did it in order to evaluate the general atmospheric transport pathways, airflow 
patterns, fast transport, and typical transport time fields, as well as characteristics of the 
atmospheric transport (number trajectories and days throughout the year when air 
parcels might reach remote geographical regions, predominant atmospheric layers for 
transport, average and minimum transport times, etc) from NRSs. We also investigated 
the seasonal, monthly, and year-to-year flow patterns in order to get a better insight into 
the flow variations.  
The current report has the following structure. In the “Introduction” Chapter, we 
describe existing sources of the radiation risk, geographical background, and general 
meteorological conditions in the Russian Far East. The “Methodology” Chapter 
provides information about research tools applied in this study. The detailed evaluation 
and analysis of the obtained results for the NRSs impact to the remote geographical 
regions, variations in the common atmospheric pathways, airflow patterns, fast, and 
typical transports, are summarized in the “Results and Discussion” Chapter, that is 
followed the “Conclusions”, “Recommendations and Future Studies” sections. The 
seasonal variations of the atmospheric transport pathways, airflow patterns, fast 
transport, and typical transport time for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs as well 
as description of the visualization software tools are combined into several Appendices. 
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1.2. Nuclear Risk Sites at the Russian Far East 
Despite the limited financial support due to economical problems and current 
significant political changes the  Pacific and Northern Fleets are rated as the two most 
powerful of the  four Russian Fleets. Both Fleets include nuclear strategicand general-
purpose submarines, and various surface vessels. The Pacific Fleet headquarters is 
located in Vladivostok, and additional bases are at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, 
Magadan, and Sovetskaya Gavan. The Northern Fleet headquarters is located in 
Severomorsk, and additional bases are Kola, Motovsky, Gremikha, and Ura Guba. To 
ensure the country's defense and security in the near future, the priorities of navy's 
development could be nuclear strategic submarines and general-purpose submarines. 
The Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets are experiencing problems with upkeep 
of their nuclear powered vessels, storage of spent nuclear fuel, and radioactive waste as 
a result of operation of these vessels. In particular, the Kola Peninsula and Severodvinsk 
area have the highest concentration of nuclear reactors in the world. A comparable 
number of nuclear reactors is  in the Russian Far East. 
Around 250 nuclear-powered submarines were built in the former Soviet Union. 
According to Egorov et al. 2000, about 140 nuclear submarines had been taken out of 
operation by 1995. By 2000, 156 nuclear submarines would be removed from the 
service. Updated recent data (Bellona-www, 2001) shows that so far, Russia has 
removed 183 nuclear-powered submarines  from the Northern and Pacific Fleet service 
(113 submarines in the Northern Fleet). These submarines are taken out of service for 
three primary reasons: requirements of the arms reduction treaty (called START-1), 
aging of the nuclear submarines, and lack of means for proper maintenance and repair 
(Nuclear Waste in the Arctic, 1995). If the strategic arms reduction talks treaty (called 
START-2) will be finalized,  an additional large number of the nuclear submarines 
would be taken out of the service. Taking into account the reactors at nuclear 
submarines and nuclear powered surface ships still in service or laid up there are total of 
476 naval military reactors (Baklanov et al., 1996). 
Currently Russia experiences problems with infrastructure and equipment to 
dismantle nuclear-powered submarines and deal with their spent fuel. Spent fuel is 
stored in obsolete onshore and floating storage facilities, inside the reactors of laid-up 
nuclear submarines and in transport containers. Storage and reprocessing sites for the 
Northern Fleet are situated in the Andreeva Bay, Gremikha, and Severomorsk (Kola 
Peninsula region) and for the Pacific Fleet in Shkotovo and Chazhma Bay (Primorie and 
Kamchatka Regions) (Bradley, 1997). 
The United States Department of Defense (US DOD)  has been  most active in 
assisting the Russian Pacific Fleet to remove missiles from the nuclear submarines, but  
future activities are under discussion. The assistance was carried out through the Co-
operative Threat Reduction  Program. The United States Department of Energy 
(USDOE) also refurbished the Shkotovo site and supplied it with the security systems. 
In 1999, two storage facilities for liquid radioactive waste in Primorskiy Kray were 
opened. Japan also showed an initiative to increase a co-operation with Russia on the 
nuclear submarines decommissioning in the Russian Far East. Japan started its nuclear 
safety assistance to Russia in  1993.  It subsidized construction of the mobile floating 
liquid waste processing facility (located at the Zvezda shipyard, Bolshoy Kamen’). 
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As with all other radiation risk sources, the nuclear submarines and storage 
facilities for the nuclear fuel represent a radiation hazard for the environment and 
population. Accidents may take place during refueling and de-fueling of the 
submarine’s nuclear reactors (Takano et al., 2001), transportation of the spent nuclear 
fuel from/to storage facilities, etc. The accident may be caused by a human error, 
technological problems, natural hazards, terrorist  actions, etc. The last well-known 
accident with a nuclear submarine, which  was not followed by the release of  
radioactive material , took place on 12 August 2000. The Russian nuclear submarine 
“Kursk” sank in the Barents Sea following two explosions in the missile area in the 
front portion of the vessel. , This occurred  not far from the Kola Peninsula (Russia, 
Murmansk region). The radiation levels in the vicinity of the submarine have  been 
monitored by the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency (NRPA) as well as the 
Murmansk Meteorological Institute (MMI). So far, there are no signs of short-lived 
isotopes in the surrounding water. Another issue of concern is that the U.S. and Russian 
nuclear-weapons systems remain on a high alert.  and  This situation , combined with 
the aging of the Russian technical systems, increases the risk of an accidental launch of 
the nuclear weapons (Forrow et al., 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1. Nuclear risk sites in the Russian Far East 
(map source: Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic, OTA-ENV-632) 
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This study is focused on the sites of potential nuclear risk in the Vladivostok and 
Kamchatka regions (Figure 1.2.1) (Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic, 1995). In particular, 
we considered two NRSs. Each of the NRSs consists of the several nuclear hazard 
sources. First, the Vladivostok nuclear risk site (VNRS) comprises the Zvezda shipyard, 
ship repair facility in Chazhma Bay, and the waste management facilities. It has 
geographical coordinates, which we used further in the trajectory modeling, 42° 55’N 
and 132° 25’E. Second, the Kamchatka nuclear risk site (KNRS) is represented by the 
Rybachiy submarine base, Gornyak shipyard, and facilities for the radioactive wastes. 
Its geographical coordinates are 52° 55’N and 158° 30’E. We have assigned these 
coordinates for the purposes of the atmospheric transport modeling. The geographical 
region of interest for modeling covers a large domain of the North Pacific region. It 
included Russia, Japan, Korea, China, and USA. In the USA, it is the Aleutian Islands, 
State of Alaska and territories on the US western shore (States of  Washington, Oregon, 
etc).  
Within the framework of the FARECS Study, Takano et al., 2001 and 
Romanova, 2001 considered two reactivity accidents (Chazhma Bay and hypothetical) 
at the nuclear submarine near the Vladivostok navy base. It has been stated that both 
accidents took place during refueling and de-fueling of the submarine’s nuclear reactors. 
In their study, the Worldwide version of the SPEEDI code (System for Prediction of 
Environmental Emergency Dose Information) (Ishikawa, 1991; Ishikawa & Chino, 
1991; Ishikawa, 1994) was used to simulate long-range atmospheric transport of 
radionuclides from the accident location and estimate radiological consequences to the 
neighboring countries. They estimated doses due to inhalation and concentration near 
the surface. Although they did not obtain high radiological doses in the remote areas, 
they have mentioned that for the winter typical meteorological conditions, the 
radionuclide atmospheric transport to Japan might occur in one to several days. Such 
transport might lead to contamination of a large area of Japan. Due to proximity of 
China and Korean Peninsula to the accident location, the doses there might be much 
higher under certain wind conditions. 
Although the focus of our study is only the two NRSs, there are other sources of 
radiation hazards at the Russian Far East. Among other sources – nuclear risk sites - of 
the radiation risk are the nuclear reactors at the nuclear power plants (NPPs). Since the 
Chernobyl accident and FSU break up, the nuclear power system in Russia underwent 
intense scrutiny. The main issue is a requirement that all plants should undergo safety 
upgrades or be closed. However, economic problems and decrease in the electricity 
demand led to lack of resources to maintain and upgrade NPPs. At the same time, 
Russia is extending licenses for its  nuclear power plants for further years of service.  
Currently, there is only one operable NPP – Bilibino - on the territory of the 
Russian Far East (Chukotka Autonomous Region, Russia). This plant uses four light-
water-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors (LGR) with a net output of 12 MWe each. It  
was constructed, and then put into commercial operation between 1973-1976. Although, 
it is the only  operable NPP in the area, according to the International Nuclear Safety 
Center (INSC), there are plans, although postponed at this moment, of the Russian 
Government to build 2 new NPPs, called the Far East and Primorskaya, at the Russian 
Far East. It is proposed to construct the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) type of 
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reactors, model VVER-600 of passive safety, and having a net output of 950 MWe 
each.  
Therefore, in the “Recommendation and Future Studies” section of this report 
we suggested additional approaches and directions for studies of the nuclear risk sources 
in the Russian Far East as well as in neighboring countries of the North Pacific region. 
1.3. Meteorology of the Russian Far East 
The Russian Far East occupies a large territory, which is  more than a third of 
the total territory of the Russian Federation. It has borders with China and North Korea, 
and only short distances separate the Sakhalin Island from Japan, and the Chukotka 
Peninsula from Alaska. It ranges from the mixed forests and steppes in the southern 
territories to tundra and arctic deserts in the northern territories. Coniferous forests 
cover an enormous area, but trees are sparsely distributed and slow growing. The 
climate in the region varies significantly from north to south, and is influenced  by  
proximity to the seas.  
The Primorskiy Kray (where VNRS is situated) stretches along the Japan Sea on 
the southeastern coast of the Russian Far East. Its area is approximately 161 thousand 
km2.  Almost two-thirds of the territory is covered by forest. The mildest climate is 
observed there. Winters are relatively short and cold with an average temperature of -
20° C (January). Summers are relatively cloudy, with frequent rain and an average 
temperature  of 25° C (July). In particular, for Vladivostok, during July-September the 
amount of precipitation is on average above 100 mm per month. The minimum of 
precipitation is 15.4 mm (January) and maximum is 148.7 mm (August). 
The Kamchatka Region (where KNRS is situated) is between the Okhotsk Sea 
on the west and Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea on the east. Its area is approximately 171 
thousand km2. The central and southern parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula have more 
than 20 active volcanoes.  They are subject to a frequent seismic activity. Surrounded by 
seas, the Kamchatka Peninsula has a mild climate. Average temperature ranges from –
10° C (January) to 14° C (July). In particular, for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy the 
minimum of precipitation is 50.8 mm (April) and the maximum is 139.2 mm (October). 
It is well known that the most immediate danger from an accident is exposure to 
high levels of radiation. There may be radiation hazard in the surrounding areas both 
near and far, depending on the type of accident, amounts of radioactivity released, as 
well as weather conditions. The influence on the environment and population will vary 
with temporal and spatial conditions. 
The meteorological conditions will play a critical role in the estimation of the 
possible atmospheric transport of any kind of pollution, including radioactive materials 
from the nuclear risk sites. Among the most important parameters are the wind field 
characteristics, temperature and humidity fields, precipitation in various forms, etc. 
Values of these parameters could depend also on the considered scale of the processes 
such as local-, meso-, regional-, large-, hemispheric-, and global scales. 
The complexity of the climate in the North Pacific region derives from the 
several factors. First, there are significant variations in the radiative effects of the 
underlying surface. Second, the studied region has unequal distribution of land and 
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water surfaces, and in particular, for our NRSs the transport mostly took place above the 
Pacific Ocean and adjacent seas territories. Third, there is well known and studied 
horizontal transport of the heat toward the northern latitudes from the south. In general, 
the North Pacific region is considered as a synoptically active region. It is characterized 
by the relatively fast cyclone development.  
The wind patterns exhibit a remarkable uniformity in the southern and eastern 
parts of the North Pacific region. Trade and westerly winds are well-developed patterns 
of the global scale and are modified by seasonal fluctuations. Due to the continental 
influence, the climatic uniformity is much less pronounced in the western and eastern 
regions at the same latitudinal belt. The western part of the North Pacific has a monsoon 
signature. The rainy season occurs during summer, when moisturized winds blow 
toward the land surface from the ocean. During winter, there is a dry season when winds 
blow from the Asian continent toward the ocean. During May-December, the southeast 
and eastern areas of Asia are under influence of the tropical cyclones (called typhoons). 
Three major centers of atmospheric activity - the Aleutian Low, Siberian High, 
and Honolulu High - have influence on the transport of air masses within the North 
Pacific and Arctic regions. All these have decadal time scales. During winter the 
Russian Far East lies on the boundary of the Arctic front, which separates two air 
masses with different characteristics: cold and dense Arctic air and the warmer and 
moister maritime air of the Northern Pacific. In summer, the position of the Arctic front 
is shifted above the Arctic Circle, and it lies in the seashore areas of the Arctic Ocean 
(Shaw, 1988). The main cyclone and anticyclone pathways are associated with activity 
of the Aleutian Low, and characterized by the 5-10 °  latitudinal north-south shift 
throughout the year. Due to presence of the Arctic front as well as topographical effects, 
a large numbers of cyclones stagnate upon reaching the area of the Bering Sea. 
For most of these territories, there is a large variation in the precipitation pattern. 
Increased precipitation will favor the washout of pollutants, and hence impact the 
deposition levels and patterns. Atmospheric circulation over these regions is strongly 
affected by the Coriolis force. In the far northern regions, the cold air temperatures, 
limited low-level moisture supply, and high static stability will be characteristic during 
winter. These conditions limit the intensity of the vertical circulation. During summer-
fall, when the background stratification is not excessively strong, intensity of cyclone 
development over the regions will depend critically on the conditions of the underlying 
surface (e.g. water surface or land, open or covered by snow or ice).  In the southern 
regions, the cyclones develop over the seashore and continental parts of Asia.  During 
winter, the atmosphere is in a stable state due to cold surface temperature. It is 
characterized by the large frequency of inversions. However, in spring it became 
unstable due to radiative heating. The intense transport of the heat and moisture from 
the low toward northern latitudes triggers the intensity of the cyclone development in 
the region. At the same time, the climatological differences in the airflow from the 
Asian continent could be observed between low and middle latitudes. During summer 
monsoon season,  there is warm and humid southeasterly airflow in the region. 
As we mentioned, the focus of this study is an analysis of the airflow patterns 
from the NRSs regions from the probabilistic point of view. We expect that the obtained 
patterns should be in a good agreement with the general synoptic scale patterns.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Impact Region Specification 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Vladivostok and Kamchatka nuclear risk sites, 
located  AT132.5°E vs. 43°N and 158.5°E vs. 53°N, respectively, might be subject to 
possible accidents. Bergman et al., 1996 and Takano et al., 2001 mentioned that nuclear 
submarines and radioactive storage facilities are potential radiation risk sources in the 
northern regions. Depending on the scenario, an accident at these sites, following by a 
subsequent radionuclide release, may have a significant impact on the environment and 
population in the North Pacific region. 
In this study, we examined the probabilistic atmospheric transport patterns from 
the nuclear risk sites near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.  These patterns,  
would be useful to estimate the possible radiological impact on different remote 
geographical regions. For this study, we selected (as shown in Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 
Japan, Korea, China, Aleutian Chain Islands, and State of Alaska (US). We named them 
as the regions of the NRS potential impact.  
Japan was divided into three major sub-regions representing northern (140-
145°E vs. 38-45°N), central (136-142°E vs. 33-38°N), and southern (130-136°E vs. 30-
36°N) territories of Japan. These include the islands and adjacent seashores. In a similar 
manner, the Korean region consists of two areas, North (124-130°E vs. 38-43°N) and 
South (125-130°E vs. 34-38°N) Korea. Due to the more complex configuration of the 
Chinese  region, we selected two areas. The first is closely adjacent to the Vladivostok 
region - the Northern Chinese Territories (120-132°E vs. 43-48°N). The second is the 
Central Shoreline China (112-124°E vs. 31-43°N). 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1. Geographical impact region in the Western North Pacific region 
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For the USA, we limited our investigation to  only the two northern regions – 
Aleutian Chain Islands (170E-160°W vs. 50-55°N), and western territories of the State 
of Alaska (166-150°W vs. 55-72°N). The mainland US territories, in particular, the US 
western shore territories of the states – Washington, Oregon, etc - were not considered 
due to 1) on average, longer than 5 days transport time from the NRS locations to these 
territories, 2) questionable accuracy of trajectory calculations after 5 days, and 3) 
framework limitations in the current study, and computer resources needed for statistical 
analysis of the longer series. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2. Geographical impact regions in the Eastern North Pacific region 
 
 
All boundaries of the selected geographical regions were chosen based on an 
assumption of the most populated geographical areas and various climatic atmospheric 
transport regimes. We note that the more precise separation of the geographical regions 
might be done by application of the GIS technology. That would permit to evaluate 
more clearly trajectory passages through the selected country.We believe that for the 
first preliminary evaluation the selection of the latitude vs. longitude box-areas  is 
sufficient. 
2.2. NCEP Global Tropospheric Analysis Dataset 
Data analysis is basic for atmospheric sciences research. Data might be 
represented in different forms and at different temporal and spatial scales. They might 
be obtained from a variety of different sources such as ground meteorological stations, 
radars, sounding, satellites, airplanes, etc. Models, which rely on intensive usage of the 
supercomputing resources, can produce gridded arrays for the commonly used basic 
  10
variables. Atmospheric models can calculate temperature, humidity, wind components, 
vertical motions and other variables at different levels. 
In our study, as input data, we used such a gridded dataset. Dataset DS082.0 - 
NCEP Global Tropospheric Analyses (from July 1976 till April 1997) is one of the 
major gridded analyses available at the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR, Boulder, Colorado). It is a part of the operational and gridded analyses 
performed at the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP; prior to 1995 
known as the National Meteorological Center – NMC). 
This dataset has a resolution of 2.5° x 2.5° latitude vs. longitude (145 x 37 grids, 
~3 Megabytes (Mb) per day) for both Northern and Southern hemispheres. It consists of 
the surface, tropospheric, tropopause, and lower stratospheric analyses as well as at the 
standard levels up to 50 millibars (mb). The main analyzed variables are the following: 
geopotential height, temperature, u-, v-, and w-components of the wind, relative 
humidity, sea level pressure, surface pressure and temperature, sea surface temperature, 
snowfall, precipitable water, potential temperature, vertical motion, tropopause pressure 
and temperature. Analysis has been done on a daily basis at 00 and 12 UTC terms 
(Universal Coordinated Time).  
The dataset is only available from the NCAR Mass Storage System (MSS). Only 
users having NCAR computer accounts may download and use. More detail information 
about DS082.0 dataset could be found at the www-address 
http://dss.ucar.edu/datasets/ds082.0/ and in publications by Baker, 1992; Trenberth & 
Olson, 1988; Randel, 1992. Starting in April 1997, the NCEP Global Tropospheric 
Analysis is accumulated in the DS083.0 dataset. A more detailed finer analysis 
(beginning 15 September 1999) is in the DS083.2 dataset. It has a global coverage too, 
but with a better - 1° x 1° latitude vs. longitude - resolution (360 x 181 grids, ~80 Mb 
per day). This analysis is given every 6 hours at the standard UTC terms of 00, 06, 12, 
and 18 hours. In our study, we did not use this most recent data. 
2.3. Isentropic Trajectory Modeling  
In general, each computed atmospheric trajectory represents a pathway of an air 
parcel motion in time and space. We consider trajectories as an estimation of the mean 
motion of a diffusing cloud of some material. There are a few approaches to model 
atmospheric trajectories. Two of these approaches are commonly used: 1) isobaric and 
2) isentropic (Danielsen, 1961). For isobaric trajectories it is assumed that air parcels 
are moving along the surfaces of the constant pressure. For isentropic trajectories it is 
assumed that air parcels are moving along the surfaces of the constant potential 
temperature. In general, of course, modeling of more realistic trajectories –the “fully 3-
D trajectories” - is preferable, but it is complex and requires incorporation of a large 
number of variables and parameters into the simulation increases the computational 
time as well. 
In our study we selected the isentropic approach. Although this type of trajectory 
model uses the assumption of adiabatically moving air parcels and neglects various 
physical effects, it is still a useful research tool for evaluating common airflow patterns 
within meteorological systems on various scales (Merrill et al., 1985; Harris & Kahl, 
1990; Harris & Kahl, 1994; Jaffe et al., 1997a; Mahura et al., 1997a; Jaffe et al., 
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1997b; Mahura et al., 1999 and others). Some uncertainties in these models are related 
to the interpolation of meteorological data, which might be sparsely measured, 
applicability of the considered horizontal and vertical scales, and assumptions of 
vertical transport (Merrill et al., 1986; Draxler, 1987; Kahl, 1996). More detail about 
computation, accuracy, and applications of trajectories is given in an excellent review 
prepared by Stohl, 1998. 
We interpolated the original National Center for Environmental Prediction 
(NCEP) gridded wind fields (from the database DS.082, see Chapter 2.2) to potential 
temperature (isentropic) surfaces. We choose isentropic assumption in our study 
because isentropic trajectories are a better representation of the air parcels atmospheric 
transport in comparison with isobaric trajectories because they are more realistic. 
Additionally we should note that the quality of trajectory calculation is highly 
dependent on the original quality of the NCEP’s fields (2.5° x 2.5° latitude vs. 
longitude), and it may not reflect the contribution of the frontal passages and local 
terrain phenomena. However, the trajectory errors rising during a single calculation 
might be smoothed in the further analysis due to the large number of trajectories in the 
multiyear dataset. 
An interpolation procedure has been performed for a period of 10 years, 1987-
1996. We applied a technique described by Merrill et al., 1986. All interpolated 3-D 
meteorological fields were stored at the Mass Storage System (MSS) at NCAR. Then, 
we used the wind fields on isentropic surfaces to calculate trajectories in the model 
domain at various levels within the atmosphere. The model grid domain selected for this 
study, covering the North Pacific territories with adjacent countries and seas, is located 
between 2.5 ° -77 ° N and 90° E-82.5° W. 
All forward isentropic trajectories from the nuclear risk sites regions were 
computed twice per day (at 00 and 12 UTC, Universal Coordinated Time) at different 
potential temperature levels. These levels (total 16) ranged from 255 ° K to 330 ° K with a 
steps of 5° K. The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR, Boulder, CO, 
USA) and International Center for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Laxenburg, 
Austria) CRAY Ouray and SUN computer resources, respectively, were used to 
compute more than 467 thousand trajectories for each NRS. Less than two percent of 
the trajectories were missing because of the absence of archived meteorological data 
and processing problems.  
In this study, instead of calculating only one trajectory for each NRS per UTC 
term, we used four trajectories for every calculation. The initial points of trajectories are 
located at each corner of a 1 ° x 1°  of latitude vs. longitude box, where NRS is in the 
center of the box. Calculation of four trajectories simultaneously allowed us to evaluate 
a consistency of the wind field in the direction of the atmospheric transport.  
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Figure 2.3.1. Examples of trajectories showing consistent air flow for Kamchatka NRS 
(left) and Vladivostok NRS (right) 
 
Although we analyzed all calculated trajectories, we should note that there are 
differences in the representation of the general flow along trajectories. The flow is 
considered to be a reasonably consistent along the transport pathway if all four 
trajectories had shown a similar direction (reflecting convergence of flow) of transport 
for one time period (as shown in Figure 2.3.1). Trajectories, showing a strong 
divergence of flow, are assigned to a category of the “complex trajectories” (as shown 
in Figure 2.3.2). These trajectories reflect more uncertainties in the air parcel motion. 
These differences are not so important in evaluation of the general climatological 
patterns, but they can be significant in, for example, identification of source regions for 
air pollutants, evaluation of the nature of the specific events with recorded elevated 
concentration of species, tracking tracers in the atmosphere, and others. 
 
    
Figure 2.3.2. Examples of trajectories showing divergence of flow (complex 
trajectories) for Kamchatka NRS (left) and Vladivostok NRS (right) 
For example, as shown in Figure 2.3.1 (right), the air parcels that originated over 
the Vladivostok NRS region at 27 March 1988, 12 UTC passed over the northern areas 
of Japan during the first days of transport. Then, it followed along the main pathway for 
the North Pacific cyclone systems toward the Aleutian Chain islands and reached the 
Aleutian Low. It should be noted that a large portion of cyclones, originating over the 
continental and shoreline parts of the Russian Far East, Japan, Korea and China, follow 
this track on the way to the Bering and Chukchi Seas.  
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For both NRS, which contains the nuclear submarine reactors and radioactive 
storage facilities, in a case of an accidental release, the most probable release heights 
would be within the surface layer of atmosphere i.e. within the first hundred meters 
above the ground. Therefore, as the next step, from all isentropic trajectories we 
selected only those trajectories originating within this layer. So, for each site, we 
extracted approximately 29 thousand trajectories (from original more than 467 thousand 
trajectories). All chosen trajectories for further statistical analysis have duration of 5 
days. We decided to use this limitation in duration of trajectories because of 1) quality 
and accuracy of trajectory calculations after 5 days drops significantly, 2) observing 
development frames of the synoptic scales systems in the North Pacific region, as well 
as 3) relative proximity of the analyzed NRS impact geographical regions from the sites 
of interest. 
Finally, to study altitudinal variations in the flow patterns (in particular, within 
the boundary layer and free troposphere), we also considered trajectories that originated 
over the NRS regions at the top of the boundary layer (i.e. we assumed - near 1.5 km 
above sea level (asl)). 
2.4. Trajectory Cluster Analysis 
In general, the cluster analysis is a variety of multivariate statistical analysis 
techniques, which could be used to explore the existing structure within data sets 
(Romesburg, 1984). The specific purpose of this analysis is to divide a data set into 
groups (or clusters) of similar variables (or cases). Miller (1981) initiated application of 
the cluster analysis on trajectories. It was used to analyze the general atmospheric 
transport pathways at the Mauna Loa Observatory (Hawaii) over the North Pacific 
Ocean. The important output of the study was evaluation of the airflow climatology, in 
particular, over  long time periods.  Later, cluster analysis techniques on trajectories 
were used extensively by various researchers in different scientific fields.   
In general, output of cluster analysis on trajectories can provide insights  on the 
tracers transport, common atmospheric flow patterns for the sites of interest, 
identification of the source regions for atmospheric pollutants, and etc. Some of these 
studies with respect to atmospheric pollutants were conducted by Moody (1986), Moody 
& Galloway (1988), Harris & Kahl (1990), Harris (1992), Harris & Kahl (1994), 
Moody et al. (1994); Dorling & Davies (1995) and others. Further, application of cluster 
analysis with respect to the nuclear risk sites, and in particular, for the nuclear power 
plants located in the Murmansk and Chukotka regions of Russia, have been performed 
by Jaffe et al. (1997a), Mahura et al. (1997a), Mahura et al. (1997b), Baklanov et al. 
(1999), Mahura et al. (1999), Saltbones et al. (2000), Baklanov et al. (2001). 
In this study, we used the same cluster analysis technique that was applied in 
Jaffe et al. (1997a), Jaffe et al. (1998a), Mahura et al. (1999), and Baklanov et al. 
(2001). The SAS/STAT software package (developed by SAS Institute Inc., 
http://www.sas.com/) has tools for many types of statistical analysis techniques 
including various cluster analysis procedures. In our study, we used the FASTCLUS 
procedure, which performs a disjoint cluster analysis on a basis of the Euclidean 
distances computed from one or more quantitative variables. All available observations 
are divided into clusters in such a manner that every observation belongs to, at least, one 
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cluster. In the case of separate analyses for different number of clusters, we run the 
FASTCLUS procedure once for each calculation. This procedure is intended for use 
with large data sets, up to 100000 observations, which is very helpful in our study due 
to large number of trajectories. It is also possible to print brief summaries of all clusters 
it finds for further detailed analysis and visualization. We requested output data sets 
containing the designated cluster membership variables for more extensive examination 
In the FARECS study, we used cluster analysis to divide calculated trajectories 
into groups, which represent the major airflow transport regimes.  The following criteria 
were used: latitude and longitude values at each time interval of 12 hours. These 
represent both direction and velocity of air parcel motion. Similarity among trajectories 
in each cluster is maximized considering the full length of each 5-day forward 
trajectory. Within each cluster, individual trajectories can be averaged to obtain the 
mean cluster trajectory (or transport pathway). Thus, the original large data set of 
trajectories can be reduced to a small number of mean cluster plots. And further, these 
plots then could be interpreted, based on common synoptic conditions and features. 
Using cluster analysis techniques, we summarized the airflow climatology for 
both NRSs regions – Vladivostok and Kamchatka. We performed the analyses on a 
seasonally, yearly, and for the entire period of 1987-1996 basis. Details on clustering 
and discussion of the results are presented in the Section of the “Results and 
Discussion” Chapter as well as in Appendix A. 
2.5. Probability Field Analysis 
Probabilistic analysis is one of the ways to estimate the likelihood of occurrence 
of one or more phenomena or events. As we mentioned, in this study we calculated a 
large number of trajectories that passed over various geographical regions. Each 
calculated trajectory contained information about longitude, latitude, altitude, pressure, 
temperature, relative humidity, and other variables at each 12 hours interval. The 
probability fields for these characteristics, either individual or combined, can be 
represented by a superposition of probabilities for the air parcels reaching each grid 
region in the chosen domain or on the geographical map. The most interest for the 
further analysis would be the following probabilistic fields: a) airflow patterns, b) 
precipitation factor, and c) fast transport.  
The first type of the fields shows the common features in the atmospheric 
transport patterns, i.e. it may provide a general insight on the possible main direction of 
the radioactive cloud’s transport as well as the probability that it will reach or pass any 
geographical area. The result of this analysis is an appropriate test to support or 
disprove results of the cluster analysis. This is because the atmospheric transport 
pathways, (or mean trajectory clusters), show only common direction of an airflow from 
the site. However, information between these pathways (or clusters) is missing. 
The second type of probabilistic field describes the possibility for removal 
processes from the contaminated air mass while air parcels pass over the particular 
geographical area. Such an analysis was used in INTAS, 2000. In our study, due to time 
constraints, we did not evaluate such fields, but discussion of the possibility of the 
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radionuclide removal during atmospheric transport is included in the “Results and 
Discussion” Chapter of this report. 
The third type of probabilistic field indicates the probability of the fast 
movement of air parcels during the first day of transport. It is important information, 
especially, for estimation of the radionuclides impact such as iodine and cesium 
isotopes. These fast transport fields show, which territories may be reached after the 
first day, and which areas are at the most danger due to faster transport probability. 
In our study, probabilistic fields were constructed two types of the fields – 
airflow and fast transport fields. To construct these fields we used latitude, longitude, 
altitude, and time step values for each 5 and 1 day’s trajectory. At the first step, a new 
rectangular grid domain was created with a resolution of 2.5° x 2.5° latitude vs. 
longitude grid cells. The NRS is located at the center of domain on the intersection 
between grid lines. All intersections of trajectories with each grid cell were counted. 
Among all grid cells, the cell where the absolute maximum of intersections took place 
was identified as an “absolute maximum cell” (AMC). Because all trajectories start near 
the NRS region, to account for contribution into the flow at the larger distances from the 
site, we extended the area of maximum to adjacent cells to the AMC. We compared the 
number of intersections in cells adjacent to AMC and assigned additional cells, which 
had less than 10% of difference between cells. Therefore, this new “area of maximums”, 
if isolines are drawn, will represent area of the highest probability of the possible impact 
(AHPPI) from NRS. Assuming the value of 100% for this area, the rest could be re-
calculated as percentage of the area at the highest probability of the possible impact. An 
illustration of the probability field for the Vladivostok NRS fast transport patterns is 
shown in Figure 2.5.1. This figure shows that during January, if an accidental release 
should take place at the Vladivostok NRS, the northern territories of Japan would be at 
the higher risk of possible NRS impact in comparison with central and southern 
territories.  
 
 
Figure 2.5.1. Vladivostok NRS fast transport probability field during January 
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In our study, probability fields reflect existing variations in the flow patterns for 
trajectories originating within the boundary layer. The analysis was done for the period 
of 1987-1996, by year, season, and month. Results of the probability field analysis are 
presented in the Section of the “Results and Discussion” Chapter as well as in 
Appendixes B and C. For this study, we also developed a visualization package using 
Matlab software (developed by MathWorks Inc., http://www.mathworks.com) to 
represent in an interactive regime monthly, seasonally, and 1987-1996 airflow and fast 
transport probability fields for the Vladivostok and Kamchatka NRS. Details are 
described in Appendix E - “Software Visualization Tools”. 
2.6. Typical Transport Time Analysis 
In the emergency response systems for nuclear accidents, the estimation of the 
radionuclide transport time to a particular territory, region, county, city, and etc is one 
of the important input parameters in the decision-making process. It is possible to 
extract such information from calculated trajectories and construct typical transport time 
fields. Such fields may show how long it will take to reach a particular geographical 
area from the nuclear risk site location, and what areas are at the highest risk during the 
first days after an accidental release.  
At the first step, we created a new polar grid domain with the risk site in the 
center. We divided the entire region into 36 sectors, where each sector represents 10 
degrees. Along each sector line, we divided distance by 2 degrees starting at the NRS 
location. For our study, we selected 70 degrees along each sector line. It is 
approximately 7.1 thousand km in distance along the latitude, if we assume that for the 
middle latitudes 1 degree is equal to 110 km. Therefore, we created a grid domain 
containing of 1260 grid cells. 
In the same way as in the probability field analysis, we counted number of 
intersections in each grid cell of the domain. To perform this operation, we initially 
transformed all trajectory end points for one time interval (for example, 2 days) 
expressed by the latitude vs. longitude into the angle and distance (or radius) from the 
NRS location. Then, for this time interval of 2 days, we compared number of 
intersections in cells along each sector line to find an absolute maximum cell (AMC). It 
should be noted that sometimes more than one maximum could be identified along the 
sector line. Because our concern is a possibility of the fastest transport to the remote 
territory, we selected the first AMC, which is the closest to NRS. After AMCs had been 
identified for all 36 sectors, the locations of sectors’ centers from the polar grid domain 
were converted back into geographical coordinates of latitude vs. longitude. Finally, an 
isoline for the typical transport time of 2 days had been drawn through these new 
geographical coordinates as shown, for example, in Figure 2.6.1.  Applying a similar 
procedure, we are able to construct isolines for other terms such as 0.5,1, 1.5 and etc 
days of transport. 
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Figure 2.6.1. Typical transport time field at 2 days (case: Vladivostok NRS, spring) 
 
 
A pitfall in the interpretation of such analytic results is the fact that the airflow 
pattern is not usually symmetrically distributed around the site of interest. Generally 
speaking, it should propagate toward the main direction of the large-scale flow pattern. 
After a few days of transport air parcels definitely will leave the area surrounding the 
nuclear risk site. Therefore, the constructed typical transport time fields in the direction 
of the lower probability of atmospheric transport will not reflect a realistic figure. That 
is illustrated by the data shown in Table 2.6.1. 
As shown in the table, for term (in days) in each sector ranging from 0 to 360 
degrees, there are a number of trajectory intersections in AMC (#), percentage of 
trajectories contribution into the 360 degrees belt (%), and test of obtained data 
significance (SS) to plot final isoline. If the distribution is symmetrical, we will have 
approximately 2.78% (100% / 36 sectors = 2.78% in each sector) of each sector’s 
contribution in the entire belt. Assuming now 2.78% as 100% of plausible contribution, 
we can recalculate the threshold (or separation) values for 75, 50, and 25%, which are 
2.08, 1.39, and 0.69%, respectively. For further analysis  (or construction of the typical 
transport time isolines), we use only those AMCs, which are above 1.39% in the total 
contribution from individual sectors. For example, as shown in the table, in the sector 
between 50-60 degrees the number of trajectories accounted in the AMC is equal to 190 
for term of 2 days. These trajectories contribute into the 360 degrees belt almost  6% of 
the total, and this contribution is higher than for the symmetrical distribution case 
(2.78%). 
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Sector # % SS Sector # % SS 
0-10 34 1.1 * 180-190 35 1.1 * 
10-20 55 1.7 >50 190-200 30 1.0 * 
20-30 80 2.5 >75 200-210 33 1.1 * 
30-40 109 3.5 OK 210-220 21 0.7 - 
40-50 136 4.3 OK 220-230 14 0.4 - 
50-60 190 6.0 OK 230-240 13 0.4 - 
60-70 282 8.9 OK 240-250 7 0.2 - 
70-80 337 10.7 OK 250-260 13 0.4 - 
80-90 408 12.9 OK 260-270 16 0.5 - 
90-100 460 14.6 OK 270-280 12 0.4 - 
100-110 274 8.7 OK 280-290 12 0.4 - 
110-120 156 4.9 OK 290-300 13 0.4 - 
120-130 90 2.9 OK 300-310 16 0.5 - 
130-140 38 1.2 * 310-320 22 0.7 * 
140-150 35 1.1 * 320-330 20 0.6 - 
150-160 36 1.1 * 330-340 25 0.8 * 
160-170 33 1.1 * 340-350 39 1.2 * 
170-180 19 0.6 - 
 
350-360 43 1.4 * 
 
Table 2.6.1. Evaluation of contribution of absolute maximum cells in the construction of 
the typical transport time field at 2 days (case: Vladivostok NRS, spring) 
 
 
To resolve differences in contribution issue the AMC data represented in the 
table with higher (threshold is higher than 1.39%) and lower (threshold is lower than 
1.39%) percentage of occurrence were marked differently (“OK” - 100% and more of 
the AMC contribution into the 360 degrees belt; “>75” – 75-100%; “>50” - 50-75%, 
”*” - 25-50%, ”-“ - <25%). Although we understand that the second type of isolines is 
based on lower number of data points, this still might reflect useful information for a 
case where an accident did happen and atmospheric transport took place in a low 
probability sector. In our study, analysis for each site was performed for the period of 
1987-1996 and by seasons. The results of this analysis are summarized in the Section of 
the “Results and Discussion” Chapter as well as in Appendix D. 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Nuclear Risk Sites Possible Impact 
In the FARECS study we analyzed all forward trajectories that originated over 
the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs locations to investigate the likelihood that the 
nuclear risk sites would impact on several distant geographical regions. We assumed 
that any isentropic trajectory, which crosses into the boundaries of the chosen 
geographical region, might bring air parcels containing radionuclides. Therefore, only 
trajectories crossing boundaries of these regions were used in the further analysis. To 
analyze the probability of the NRSs’ impact, we estimated the following parameters.  
First, we estimated the number and percentage of trajectories reaching the 
boundaries of the chosen geographical regions. Second, we evaluated the number and 
percentage of days that at least one trajectory had reached the region. Third, we 
calculated the average transport time of air parcels to reach these regions. Fourth, we 
analyzed the probability of transport within different atmospheric layers. Fifth, we 
investigated the likelihood of very rapid (fast) transport of air parcels, i.e. transport in 
one day or less. We performed such evaluation over the 10 year study period (1987-
1996), by individual year, season, and month to investigate possible temporal and 
spatial variations in the airflow patterns from the NRSs’ regions. A summary of the 
transport from the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs to the chosen geographical 
regions is shown in Table 3.1.1. Monthly variations in the average transport time (in 
days) and number of trajectories reaching regions during 1987-1996 are shown in 
Figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for both NRSs. 
To estimate the probability of impact, the number of trajectories reaching the 
region and the number of days this took were calculated. If one or more trajectories 
crossed a region during the day (00 and 12 UTC), we assume that this day is a day of 
impact in that region. This approach yields two values to estimate the probability of 
impact that air in the VNRS region will be transported to geographical region. If one 
considers all the forward trajectories starting at the Vladivostok NRS, then, for example 
(as shown in Table 3.1.1.), 31.9% of these reach the North Japan region. If instead one 
considers the percentage of days when one or more trajectories reach the same region, 
then an annual average value of 53.5% is obtained. Since there are 8 forward trajectories 
from VNRS calculated per day (4 each at 00 and 12 UTC), then on average, 3-4 
(7249/1919=3.8) trajectories will reach this geographical region, if any do on that day. 
To some extent, the understanding of the probability of impact is related to the duration 
of any release that may occur. The percentage of all trajectories represents the 
probability that air from the Vladivostok NRS region is transported to the North Japan 
region at any given moment. However, if an accident release was to occur for 24 hours, 
then the 53.5% value is probably more appropriate to consider. Therefore, the 53.5 and 
31.9% values represent upper and lower bounds to the probability of impact. 
Taking into account that the thickness of the boundary layer for a neutral 
stratification of the atmosphere is close to 850 hPa (≈1.5 km), the trajectories were 
divided into two categories. First, there are trajectories that transport air within the 
boundary layer. Second, there are trajectories that transport air in the free troposphere. 
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The higher concentrations of radionuclides are more likely at the surface in the cases of 
the boundary layer transport,. For the Kamchatka NRS (see Table 3.1.1), the boundary 
layer transport dominates in the South Japan region and it occurs in 69.2% of the cases. 
The lowest probabilities of such transport are 7.2, 9.8, and 6.7% of the time for the  
North Korea, North China, and Seashore China regions. For the Vladivostok NRS, the 
boundary layer transport also prevails in the South Japan region (87.1% of the cases) as 
well as in the South Korea region (72.6%).  The highest probabilities of the free 
troposphere transport are for the US territories. Although the boundary layer transport 
may occur in any time of the year, there are times of the year when it is more frequent. 
We reflected this in Table 3.1.1 as the higher occurrence of the boundary transport. 
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Figure 3.1.1A. Monthly variations in the average transport time (in days) from the 
Kamchatka NRS to geographical regions based on the forward trajectories during 1987-
1996 
 
The cases of the fast transport (1 day or less), as shown in Table 3.1.1, account 
on average between 0-24.1% (KNRS) and 0-62.8% (VNRS) of the cases from the total 
number of trajectories that crossed into the regions. In particular, it depends on the 
NRS’s proximity to a particular geographical region. For example, 4555 trajectories 
reached the North Japan region in a day or less from the total of 7249 trajectories that 
reached the same region during 1987-1996. These 4555 trajectories represent 62.8% of 
the 7249 trajectories (as 100%). For the Kamchatka NRS, we did not identify any fast 
transport events to the Korean, Chinese, and Central and South Japan regions. The 
highest possibility of such events – 24.1% of the time - is for the Aleutian Chain 
Islands. For the Vladivostok NRS, we did not observe any fast transport events to either 
US territory, but they are common in all other geographical regions. Their occurrence 
depends on the proximity of the nuclear risk site to the region. 
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The monthly variations of the average transport time from NRSs to the 
geographical regions (shown in Figures 3.1.1A and 3.1.1B) are obvious. In general, it 
depends on the seasonal change in the wind speed.  During winter, the speed is higher 
compared with the summer period. Therefore, the travel time increases in summer and 
decreases in winter. The yearly averages and standard deviations for the transport time 
are shown in Table 3.1.1. For the Kamchatka NRS, the average transport time is the 
shortest to reach the Aleutian Chain Islands and it is equal to approximately 3 days. For 
all other regions, it varies from 4.3 to 6.3 days. For the Vladivostok NRS,  
Monthly average transport time from the Vladivostok NRS to the geographical 
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Figure 3.1.1B. Monthly variations in the average transport time (in days) from the 
Vladivostok NRS to geographical regions based on the forward trajectories during 
1987-1996 
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Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the Kamchatka NRS 
and reached the geographical regions during 1987-1996
(US Aleutian Chain Island & Alaska State - not included)
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Figure 3.1.2A1. Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originating over the 
Kamchatka NRS at lower altitudes within the boundary layer and reaching the 
geographical regions during 1987-1996 
the average transport time is the shortest – 0.5 days - for the North China region (it is 
due to proximity of the geographical region to NRS), and the longest – 7 days – for the 
Alaska State region. For all other regions, it varies from 1.6 to 5.7 days.  
The monthly variations of the higher occurrence of transport for trajectories 
reaching the geographical regions during 1987-1996 are shown in Figures 3.1.2 and 
summarized in Table 3.1.1. The atmospheric transport from the Kamchatka NRS to the 
Japanese regions occurs more often during winter season, although it continues in the 
spring in the North and Central Japan regions. This transport dominates during 
November-February in the Korean regions, and during November-March in the Chinese 
regions. For the US territories, transport in summer is more common, although for the 
Aleutian Chain Islands the period continues from April to November. For the 
Vladivostok NRS, atmospheric transport toward the US territories is more frequent 
during August-October (Figure 3.1.2B), although a peculiarity is the high probability of 
transport in May too. The transport occurs most frequently during winter-spring for the 
North and Central Japan regions, although in the South Japan, Korean, and North China 
regions it takes place during the spring-fall months. 
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Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the Kamchatka NRS 
and reached the geographical regions during 1987-1996
(US Aleutian Chain Islands & Alaska State)
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Figure 3.1.2A2. Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the 
Kamchatka NRS at lower altitudes within the boundary layer and reached the US 
regions during 1987-1996 
Finally, we should mention several findings from the analysis of the NRSs 
possible impact to the studied geographical regions.  
For the Vladivostok NRS, the North China and North Japan regions are at higher 
risk of possible impact than the other regions. It is mainly due to their proximity to 
NRS. For the Korean regions, it is lower due to peculiarities in the general airflow 
patterns of westerly origin. The lower and (upper) bounds of the probability of impact 
are 31.9 (53.5)% and 34.7 (86.9)% for the North China and North Japan regions, 
respectively. On average, atmospheric transport to these regions could occur in 0.5 and 
1.6 days, respectively. The fast transport events are not common for the US territories, 
but these events could represent the major concerns for the Japanese and North Korea 
regions. The boundary layer transport is common for all regions for more than half of 
the time, except for the US regions. 
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Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the Vladivostok 
NRS and reached the geographical regions during 1987-1996
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Figure 3.1.2B. Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originating over the 
Vladivostok NRS at lower altitudes within the boundary layer and reaching the 
geographical regions during 1987-1996 
For the Kamchatka NRS, the US territories are at the highest risk compared to 
the other regions. The lower and (upper) bounds of the probability of impact are 29.9 
(53.8)% and 13.4 (32.1)% for the Aleutian Chain Islands and State of Alaska, 
respectively. On average, atmospheric transport to these regions could occur in 3.0 and 
5.1 days, respectively. For all other regions, the bounds of the probability of impact are 
only around a few percent with the exception of the North Japan region (8%). In the 
same way, the fast transport events are also observed only in these – North Japan, 
Aleutian Chain Islands, and State of Alaska geographical regions. The boundary layer 
transport dominates in most of the studied regions, but the free troposphere transport 
dominates in the Chinese and North Korea regions. 
3.2. Atmospheric Transport Pathways 
In this study, we evaluated the transport patterns from the NRSs regions. We 
found that the average transport times to the chosen geographical regions (as shown in 
Table 3.1.1) vary from half a day to 7 days, depending on the NRS considered. Because 
of uncertainties in the trajectory calculations after 5 days, we decided to use in the 
cluster analysis only forward trajectories with the duration of 5 days. Figures 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2 show the atmospheric transport pathways from the KNRS and VNRS regions 
using trajectories during 1987-1996, which had an origin within the atmospheric 
boundary layer. The mean trajectory for each cluster is given with points indicating 12-
hour intervals. Two numbers were used for each cluster: first - identifier of a cluster; 
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second - percentage of trajectories within a cluster. The seasonal summary for 
atmospheric transport pathways from both NRSs is shown in Table 3.2.1. 
 
 
Kamchatka NRS Vladivostok NRS 
Transport to (in %) Transport to (in %) 
 
Season 
West North East West North East 
Spring 23  87 7 17 76 
Summer 26  74  18 82 
Fall 15 17 68  32 68 
Winter 37  63 10 14 76 
 
Table 3.2.1. Seasonal summary for atmospheric transport pathways from the Kamchatka 
and Vladivostok NRSs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1. Atmospheric transport pathways (cluster mean trajectories) from the 
Kamchatka NRS region based on the forward trajectories during 1987-1996 
In our study, six clusters were identified for the trajectories originating over the 
Kamchatka NRS region within the boundary layer (Figure 3.2.1). Four of them (#1, 2, 3 
and 4 with 2, 31, 8 and 22% of occurrence, respectively) show westerly flow. These 
were observed about 63% of the time. Cluster #1 was used to show the possibility of the 
relatively rapid westerly flow toward the State of Alaska and Canadian territories. 
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Cluster #6 (8%) shows easterly flow toward the continent both within the boundary 
layer and free troposphere. Cluster #5, which occur 29% of the time, is also transport to 
the west but it is significantly slower compared with cluster #6. Throughout the year, 
westerly flow is predominant for the Kamchatka NRS (see Table 3.2.1). Transport from 
the west varies from 63% (in winter) to 87% (in spring) of the time. Transport from the 
east occurs from 15% (in fall) to 37% (in winter) of the cases. Transport with the 
northward component is only during fall and it is equal to 17% of the cases. 
A similar number of clusters – six – were identified for the trajectories 
originating within the boundary layer over the Vladivostok NRS region (Figure 3.2.2). 
Four of them (#1, 3, 5 and 6 with 32, 3, 11 and 21% of occurrence, respectively) show 
westerly flow too. These were observed about 67% of the time. Among these clusters, 
cluster #3 represents the possibility of the relatively rapid westerly flow toward the 
North America territories. Cluster #4 (22%) shows easterly flow.  Cluster #2, which 
occur 11% of the time, is transport with the northward component of the flow through 
the Okhotsk Sea. Throughout the year, the westerly flow is also dominant for the 
Vladivostok NRS (see Table 3.2.1). Transport from the west varies from 68% (in fall) to 
82% (in summer) of the time. Transport from the east occurs only during winter-spring 
and varies from 7% (in spring) to 10% (in winter) of the cases. Transport with the 
northward component is a peculiarity of the Vladivostok NRS. It is reflected in each 
season throughout the year and varies from 14% (in winter) to 32% (in fall) of the time. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2. Atmospheric transport pathways (cluster mean trajectories) from the 
Vladivostok NRS region based on the forward trajectories during 1987-1996 
We found that for both NRSs the westerly flow is dominant throughout the year, 
and occurs more than 60% of the time. The relatively rapid westerly flow toward the 
North America continent can reach the maximum occurrence during fall-winter (8-11% 
of the time) and during winter-spring (12-13% of the time) for the Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok NRSs, respectively. At the higher altitudes - 1.5 and 3 km asl (i.e. within 
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the free troposphere) the probability of transport from the west increases up to 85% of 
the time. Detailed seasonal variations in the mean transport pathways from the 
Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs within the boundary layer are shown in Appendix A. 
3.3. Airflow and Fast Transport Probability Fields within the Boundary 
Layer 
To test and compare the results of clustering we calculated the airflow 
probability field using all forward trajectories that originated over the Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok NRSs regions during 1987-1996. Such probability fields show 
geographical variations in the airflow patterns from the chosen sites. In a climatological 
sense, the path of airflow from the chosen site could be represented by a superposition 
of the probability of air parcels reaching each grid region on a geographical map. The 
regions with higher occurrence of trajectory passages are areas where the probability of 
the possible NRSs impact will be higher.  
Figure 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 show the airflow probability fields for the Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok NRSs constructed using all the 1987-1996 trajectories. Each probabilistic 
field is presented using isolines, given with an interval of 5%, on the background of the 
geographical maps. The areas of the higher probability, which are located close to the 
NRSs regions, indicate that trajectories have spent more time in this geographical area. 
Because all trajectories start near the site, the cumulative probability is 100% there. 
Thus, the field was altered using the similar correction factor as Poirot & Wishinski, 
1986 and Merrill, 1994. This factor takes into account the contribution of flow at greater 
distances. The airflow probability fields also show that westerly flows are predominant 
for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs regions. It is in agreement with the results of 
the trajectories’ cluster analysis. 
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Figure 3.3.1. Airflow probability field within the boundary layer for the trajectories, 
originated over the Kamchatka NRS region during 1987-1996 (isolines are shown every 
5%) 
 
For the Kamchatka NRS, the airflow is concentrated along the major tracks of 
the high and lower pressure systems. These systems are always under the influence of 
the Aleutian Low and Siberian High activities. During fall, the airflow reaches the 
North America continent. During May-November the possibility for the air masses to 
pass over the North Japan region is the lowest. November is a time when air masses 
have ability to reach the Arctic shore territories, and it is a time for the Arctic front to 
move northward at the Russian Far East. During August, the airflow could pass over 
parts of the State of Alaska. 
For the Vladivostok NRS, the similar dominance of the westerly flow could be 
identified. During summer, the northward component of the airflow became evident. At 
the end of the spring, it passes over the northern parts of the continental areas of the 
Russian Far East. During August-November, the airflow could reach the northern areas 
of the Okhotsk Sea and seashore of the Magadan Region. In September, the airflow 
pattern could be observed in the Seashore China region reaching the lower 30 ° N 
latitudes. Detailed seasonal airflow probability fields within the boundary layer for both 
sites are shown in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3.3.2. Airflow probability field within the boundary layer for the trajectories, 
originated over the Vladivostok NRS region during 1987-1996 (isolines are shown 
every 5%) 
 
Although atmospheric transport from the radiation risk site or region to another 
geographical area might occur at any time, the fast transport is the greatest concern. It is 
an especially valid and important issue for the measures of the emergency response and 
preparedness. To study the contribution of the fast transport we evaluated all available 
trajectories during the first day of their transport, i.e. all trajectories were routinely 
terminated after 1 day of transport. In a similar way, as for the airflow probability, we 
constructed the fast transport probability fields. All these fields show the probability of 
air transport from the NRSs during the first day with respect to the area of the maximum 
possible impact from the NRSs marked as 100 (Figure 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). The analysis has 
been done for the entire period and each year, as well as by season and month. We 
analyzed the lowest altitude of trajectories, i.e. trajectories starting below 0.5 km asl. 
This is due to the major importance of the boundary layer transport, especially for the 
relatively short-lived radionuclides and during the first several hours after an accident. 
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Figure 3.3.3. Fast transport probability field within the boundary layer for the 
trajectories, originated over the Kamchatka NRS region during 1987-1996 (isolines are 
shown every 10%) 
Our analysis of the fast transport probability fields showed that the westerly flow 
is dominant for both NRSs. It is also in agreement with the results of the cluster analysis 
of trajectories. 
For the Kamchatka NRS, the area of the highest probability of the possible 
impact (AHPPI) from the NRS is located to the southeast from the site, except during 
summer. During winter, there is a possibility of the fast transport toward the Sakhalin 
Island. During fall and spring, it could reach the Magadan Region territories. In summer 
due to lower wind speeds, it is concentrated around the NRS region. During December-
April, the fast transport field reflects possibility of reaching the Sakhalin Island and 
Magadan Region territories. During September-October, it almost reaches the Magadan 
city adjacent territories. In November, there is a possibility to reach the Primorskiy 
Kray. The AHPPI is located to the east and south of the NRS during November-
December. In October, it is to the north, and during February-March – to the west of the 
site. Starting in May, the total area of the AHPPI, which is under influence of the fast 
transport pattern, decreases, but in August, it will start again to increase. 
For the Vladivostok NRS, the AHPPI is also to the east and south of the site. 
Although during winter it is located far from NRS, during summer it is around the site. 
During fall, AHPPI is over the Japan Sea territories. During December-April, it is above 
the North and Central Japan regions. In May, which might be considered as a transition 
period, there are two AHPPI – above the Japan Sea and to the north of VNRS in the 
Russian Far East. During June-August and October-November, the AHPPI is situated 
above the Japan Sea. In September, the southward component prevails. During 
September-November, there is a possibility to reach rapidly the North and South Korean 
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regions. Appendix D shows seasonal variations in the fast transport pattern for both 
NRSs. The monthly variations of the airflow and fast transport patterns for both sites are 
stored at the RAD FARECS CD. They could be displayed using developed MATLAB-
oriented software (see details in Appendix D). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.4. Fast transport probability field within the boundary layer for the 
trajectories, originated over the Vladivostok NRS region during 1987-1996 (isolines are 
shown every 10%) 
 
3.4. Typical Transport Time Fields 
Typical transport time fields are shown in Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 for the 
Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs, respectively. Isolines of 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, and 2.5 days 
of transport were constructed using 36 points (i.e. for each sector of 10º of total 360º 
there is one point). Due to time constraints, we created fields for only 1987-1996 period. 
All summarized data for seasons are tabulated in Appendix D and RAD FARECS CD. 
Therefore, if required, the typical transport time fields could be constructed 
independently.  
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As shown in Figure 3.4.1 the typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS to 
reach the northern seashore areas of Japan is 1 day. Further, during 1-2 days the air 
parcels will pass over the Northern Japan. Typical transport time to reach the Koreas is 
about 2 days. We should note that the pattern of these fields depends strongly on the 
dominance of the westerly flows. Therefore, it is stretched toward the main tracks of the 
cyclones traveling to the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. For the Kamchatka NRS 
(Figure 3.4.2), only the territories of the Kamchatka Region and islands in the adjacent 
seas, in particular, the Komandor Islands (Russia) and the far western islands of the 
Aleutian Chain Islands (USA) can be reached during the first 2.5 days  
 
 
Figure 3.4.1. Typical transport time field from the Kamchatka NRS 
 
The typical transport time fields are useful information in the emergency 
preparedness and response because these fields show: 1) How far the air parcels might 
travel from the NRS location during X-days of transport, and 2) What time it could take 
for an air parcel to reach the particular geographical area of concern. 
An additional difficulty in construction of these fields also depends on how 
many data points we use to construct the fields. At the first approximation, we have 
only 36 for each temporal isoline. Near the site, due to short distances, we did not 
expect any difficulties. Far from the site, all original data points are relatively distant 
from each other along the isolines, i.e. there is a large gap between data points. The 
“smoothing” interpolation procedure will require additional intermediate points in the 
10°  sectors. To resolve this issue we suggest, in the future studies, to perform 
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calculation for the larger number of sectors; for example, 72 (5 °  in each sector) or finer 
resolution. It will allow one to construct the typical transport time fields more exactly. 
Although we have data for seasons (tabulated in Tables of Appendix D) and 
1987-1996 (shown in Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), we would recommend consider month-
to-month variability for better interpretation of the typical transport times to 
geographical territories. 
In the FARECS study, due to time constraints, we did not analyze the 
probabilistic fields for the precipitation factor, although in the next section of this report 
we discuss approaches that could be used to evaluate the radionuclide transport, 
dispersion, and removal. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.2. Typical transport time field from the Vladivostok NRS 
3.5. Approaches to Evaluate Radionuclide Transport, Dispersion, and 
Removal 
During the transport of any kind of pollutants, including radionuclides, within 
the atmosphere many different processes may influence the distribution of substances. 
In general, the temporal change of the radionuclide concentration during atmospheric 
transport will depend on the following factors. The dispersion, in all directions, due to 
horizontal advection by a wind velocity vector and turbulent diffusion processes are the 
most important factors. All radionuclides during transport are subject to dry deposition 
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of gaseous and particulate nuclides from the atmosphere by vegetation, biological, or 
mechanical processes and wet removal by precipitation, rainout, and snow. Other 
factors are radioactive decay and resuspension (i.e. lifting of already deposited material 
again back into the atmosphere), which is a secondary source of contamination and 
mostly appropriate on a local scale. Although contribution of all factors are important, 
there is always a possibility to ignore some of them depending on the scale of analysis 
and each term’s contribution to a particular problem. 
Wet deposition is the term of most concern. It is highly temporally and spatially 
dependent. It plays important role in the estimation of the radionuclide surface 
deposition. Deposition of radionuclides at the surface due to washout might produce a 
cellular figure as was recorded after the Chernobyl accident. Among several tens of 
radionuclides there are only a few of main interest - 137, 134Cs, 131, 133I, 89, 90Sr, 132Te, 
140Ba, 103Ru, and 238, 239Pu. In particular, iodine and cesium are isotopes of the major 
concern after the nuclear accidents, and especially during the first days. 
In our study, due to time constraints, we did not analyze the possible 
contribution of the removal processes during atmospheric transport from the NRSs 
locations. There are several approaches how we might investigate this topic. 
The first approach is based on the evaluation of the precipitation climatology for 
the particular geographical area. Such climatological maps (on a multiyear and seasonal 
basis for the large scale domains) might be obtained from the meteorological weather 
services. These maps would reflect the accumulated precipitation measured near the 
surface for each interval of time. It may be used for identification of the large size areas 
having common precipitation patterns. In particular, on such maps these areas are 
connected with the major centers of synoptic activity, for example, Aleutian Low. 
However, air parcels might travel within different atmospheric layers during their 
transport from the NRS region. For example, an air parcel could travel in the free 
troposphere and there may be no precipitation in this layer.  However, the area is 
marked as precipitable on the climatological map and that will raise a misleading 
concern.  
Therefore, the second approach is based on the evaluation of the probabilistic 
fields for the “precipitation factor” (Mahura et al., 1999; INTAS, 2000). Relative 
humidity “plays a role” of the precipitation factor. As we mentioned in the Second 
Chapter of this report, at each time interval of 12 hours for each forward trajectory we 
can calculate additional parameters including relative humidity. It is one of the factors, 
which will determine the possibility of radionuclide removal during transport. 
Increasing relative humidity in the atmosphere is one of the signals of the water vapor’s 
increasing presence, and it may, in the presence of the cloud condensation nuclear 
(CCN), lead to formation of cloud cover. After clouds develop and form, under certain 
conditions there is a possibility of precipitation, and hence, radionuclide removal. 
Construction of the relative humidity fields is similar to the first steps in the probability 
field analysis. In this case we calculate an average value of the relative humidity in each 
grid cell. Both the precipitation and relative humidity fields have a cellular figure in 
comparison with the airflow pattern. A pitfall in this analysis is the fact that all relative 
humidity values are directly related to the existing flow pattern. So, each field is valid 
only with respect to a particular NRS. Nevertheless, it is a more realistic pattern of the 
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possible removal during transport than calculating rainfall climatological maps used in 
the first approach, because it includes processes above the surface. 
The limitation always is how we might resolve precipitation processes during air 
parcels transport. To resolve them we would need a finer meteorological data resolution. 
The third approach is based on the direct evaluation of the wet deposition factor fields at 
the surface (DMI-NARP, 2001). It is also required to have multiyear output fields for 
comparison. For these purposes, we might run a transport model for a multiyear period 
and include one of the parameters of interest. Both the National Center for 
Environmental Prediction (NCEP, USA, North America) and European Center Medium 
Weather Forecast (ECMWF, Reiding, Great Britain, Europe) analyses, have resolution 
of more than 1 degree. Although HIRLAM model (at Danish Meteorological Institute, 
DMI) data might provide 3-D meteorological fields with a resolution of 0.15º x 0.15º 
latitude vs. longitude grids, there is still an issue of the computational resources usage.  
If we assume either a unit puff release or continuous release every 12 hours at 
NRS, and run a model of atmospheric transport, dispersion, and removal of the 
radioactive material, we might produce a field for the wet deposition accumulated 
during a multiyear period. From one side, we might estimate what would be 
accumulated deposition field if a continuous release took place. From another side, we 
might identify the geographical areas, presumably of the cellular nature. These areas are 
territories where greatest removal of radionuclides is possible during transport from the 
site. It should be noted that such fields are also (as in the second approach) valid with 
respect to the particular site of interest. 
Additionally, useful information might be obtained if we have the averaged 
climatological airflow patterns for the regional or local scale. We can evaluate seasonal 
and monthly average wet deposition factor fields applying averages for wind 
characteristics, precipitation, temperature, relative humidity, etc. For this case, the 
averaged 3-D meteorological fields are simulated, and then they are used in the 
transport model to calculate such characteristics as the air concentration, surface 
deposition, and doses. Specific cases for both unit and hypothetical, such as maximum 
projected accident (MPA), releases might be considered. Additional cases of the 
unfavorable meteorological conditions might be evaluated too (INTAS, 2000; OCB, 
2000). Produced characteristic monthly or seasonal fields of the air concentration, 
deposition, and various doses could be used in the decision-making process at the first 
stages of the NRS accidents. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of the FARECS study was to evaluate the atmospheric 
transport of pollutants from the Vladivostok and Kamchatka NRSs from the 
probabilistic point of view. The main question was: What is the probability to 
neighboring countries of radionuclide atmospheric transport in the case of an accident at 
the nuclear risk sites in the Russian Far East?  
To answer this question, we applied the following research tools. The 
atmospheric isentropic trajectory model had been used to calculate trajectories that 
originated at two nuclear risk sites locations in the Russian Far East – Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok. The statistical analysis tools - exploratory, cluster, and probability field 
analyses - have been applied to explore the structure of the trajectory data sets. We 
evaluated the common atmospheric transport pathways from NRSs, airflow patterns, 
fast transport (i.e. transport in less than 1 day), and typical transport time, as well as 
characteristics of the atmospheric transport to the selected regions of interest – Japan, 
China, North and South Korea, State of Alaska, and Aleutian Chain Islands. We also 
investigated the seasonal, monthly, and year-to-year flow patterns in order to get better 
insight into the airflow variations. Further studies on the possible impacts of the 
radionuclide removal processes during atmospheric transport are suggested. 
 
The main findings of this study are: 
 
I. We found that for both NRSs, the westerly flow is dominant within the 
boundary layer throughout the year, and occurs more than 60% of the time. At 
the higher altitudes - 1.5 and 3 km asl (i.e. within the free troposphere), the 
probability of transport from the west increases up to 85% of the time. The 
relatively rapid westerly flow toward the North America continent reaches  
maximum occurrence during fall-winter (8-11% of the time) and during winter-
spring (12-13% of the time) for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs, 
respectively. 
 
II. For the Vladivostok NRS, the North China and North Japan regions are at the 
highest risk of possible impact.   It is mainly due to their proximity to VNRS. It 
is lower for the Korean regions due to peculiarities in the general airflow 
patterns of westerly origin. The lower (and upper) bounds of the VNRS’s 
possible impact are about 32 (54) and 35 (87)% for the North China and North 
Japan regions, respectively. On average, atmospheric transport to these regions 
could occur in 0.5 and 1.6 days, respectively. The fast transport events are not 
common for the US territories, but they could represent major concerns for the 
Japanese and North Korean regions. Except for the US territories, the boundary 
layer transport reaches all regions more than half of time,  
 
III. For the Kamchatka NRS, the US territories are at the highest risk compared to 
the rest of the regions. The lower (and upper) bounds of the KNRS’s possible 
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impact are 30 (54) and 13 (32)% for the Aleutian Chain Islands and State of 
Alaska, respectively. On average, atmospheric transport to these regions could 
occur in 3.0 and 5.1 days, respectively. For all other regions, the bounds of 
possible impact are only a few percent with the exception of the North Japan 
region (8%). In the same way, the fast transport events are observed only in 
these three – Aleutian Chain Islands, State of Alaska, and Northern Japan 
geographical regions. The boundary layer transport dominates in most of the 
considered regions, but free troposphere transport dominates in the Chinese and 
North Korean regions. 
 
IV. The typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS to reach the northern 
seashore areas of Japan is 1 day. Further, during 1-2 days the air parcels will 
pass over the Northern Japan. Typical transport time to reach the Koreas is about 
2 days. For the Kamchatka NRS, only the territories of the Kamchatka Region 
and islands in the adjacent seas - Komandor Islands (Russia) and the far western 
islands of the Aleutian Chain Islands (USA) - can be reached during the first 2.5 
days 
 
We believe that results of the FARECS study are applicable for the emergency 
response and preparedness measures in the cases of the accidental releases at the nuclear 
risk sites. They should be included in the decision-making processes and required 
provision plans to accidents for the countries surrounding NRSs. We believe, that our 
study methodology – trajectory modeling and a variety of the statistical analysis tools – 
is also a useful approach to estimating the possible impact from any other sources. 
There  could be chemical, biological or other sources of the pollution that represent risk 
to population and environment. 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES  
Several concluding remarks and recommendations are made to clarify the 
applicability and importance of the FARECS’s study results. 
These results are initial steps to estimate probabilities of the atmospheric 
transport from the nuclear risk sites locations situated at the Russian Far East. In the 
event of an accidental release they can be used as a preliminary estimation of the 
likelihood and direction of the atmospheric transport, evaluation of the minimum and 
average transport times, and identification of the predominant atmospheric layer during 
transport reaching the borders of counties, countries, and remote geographical regions. 
Emergency response plans to possible radionuclide releases from the nuclear 
risk sites could be improved by analyses of the fast transport, airflow patterns, and 
average transport time fields. These are input to better understanding of seriousness of 
possible radionuclide releases from the nuclear risk sites. The FARECS’s study output 
is valuable input data for the studies of the social and economical consequences for 
population and environment of the neighboring countries, and especially, on a regional 
scale due to impact of accidents at the nuclear risk sites. These are important data for 
the studies of the multidisciplinary risk and vulnerability analysis, and probabilistic 
assessment of the radionuclide meso-, regional-, and long-range transport. Additionally, 
these results could be used for testing of higher resolution models. 
 
Therefore, we recommend further studies on the following issues: 
 
I. Analysis of the probabilistic patterns of atmospheric transport from the 
Vladivostok and Kamchatka NRSs raises concerns  for the possible fast 
transport as well as radionuclide deposition in the neighboring countries such as 
Japan, Korea, China, and USA. Although a specific case study had been 
performed by Romanova et al., 2001 and Takano et al., 2001 for one of the 
months during winter, an additional extended study would be required to 
evaluate possible air concentration, surface deposition and doses with respect to 
different geographical regions and countries under other seasonal conditions. A 
simple scoping approach to evaluate these characteristics at remote distances 
from the nuclear risk site location was suggested by Compton, 2001b.   For a 
more advanced study, these characteristics might be evaluated on a monthly and 
seasonal basis using obtained probabilistic fields. An evaluation of these 
characteristics would provide insight on the level and probability of the risk for 
the population in the North Pacific region. 
 
II. Another interesting aspect would be an evaluation of the impact from the nuclear 
weapons-related facilities and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities located in the 
northern regions of China and Japan, respectively. A similar approach but more 
detailed analysis might be taken as in the FARECS study. This analysis could 
include both the probabilistic approach for the atmospheric transport patterns 
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and evaluation of the air concentration, surface deposition, and doses for the 
neighboring countries due to possible accidental releases. 
 
III. There is large number of the radiation risk sources located in the countries of the 
North Pacific region. All of these sources represent risks of different 
magnitudes, and their “possible danger” is highly dependent on many factors. In 
general, the simplest approach is to know the source term as one of the main 
factors. But it seems reasonable to ask: What is the range  of each radiation risk 
source with respect to another as well as due to other various factors? At the first 
step, an evaluation of the probabilities’ matrix for the transport pathways in 
different environments, fast transport, and removal processes might give an 
answer on this question. For comprehensive evaluation, the additional factors 
such as probabilities of the accidental releases, prevailing scenarios, 
accumulated activities, types of radioactive material, and etc should be 
considered. Such analysis might rank the risk sources in the order of their 
potential danger with respect to population and environment. This allows the 
policy and decision makers to make an informed decision – which sources 
should be considered as the first priority of study, and what measures should be 
taken if an accidental release will occur. Of course, for an accident, the detailed 
examination of the conditions at the site, the accident scenario and prevailing 
atmospheric conditions must be taken into account.  
 
IV. As we mentioned in the Introduction, there are plans of the Russian Government 
to build new NPPs - Far East and Primorskaya - on the Russian Far East.  
According to Bergman et al., 1996 and Baklanov et al., 1996 the nuclear power 
plants in comparison with the nuclear submarines could be objects of the highest 
potential risk because of their much higher inventory of  radioactive material. 
Hence, an evaluation of the possible impact of these proposed facilities to the 
neighboring countries in a case of an accidental release would be important. The 
detailed information about the current status of the planned NPPs could be 
obtained from the Russian MinAtom International Nuclear Safety Center, 
RMINSC (http://www.insc.ru/) as well as International Nuclear Safety Center, 
INSC (http://www.insc.anl.gov/). 
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APPENDIX A: Figures 
Seasonal Atmospheric Transport Pathways for the Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok NRSs 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Kamchatka NRS during spring 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Kamchatka NRS during summer 
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Figure A3. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Kamchatka NRS during fall 
 
 
 
Figure A4. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Kamchatka NRS during winter 
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Figure A5. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Vladivostok NRS during spring 
 
 
 
Figure A6. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Vladivostok NRS during summer 
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Figure A7. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Vladivostok NRS during fall 
 
 
 
Figure A8. Atmospheric transport pathways from the Vladivostok NRS during winter. 
  49
APPENDIX B: Figures 
Seasonal Airflow Probability Fields within the Boundary Layer 
for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs 
 
Figure B1. KNRS Spring airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure B2. KNRS Summer airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
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Figure B3. KNRS Fall airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure B4. KNRS Winter airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
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Figure B5. VNRS Spring airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure B6. VNRS Summer airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
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Figure B7. VNRS Fall airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure B8. VNRS Winter airflow probability field within the boundary layer 
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APPENDIX C: Figures  
Seasonal Fast Transport Probability Fields within the Boundary Layer 
for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs 
 
Figure C1. KNRS Spring fast transport probability field within boundary layer 
 
Figure C2. KNRS Summer fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
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Figure C3. KNRS Fall fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure C4. KNRS Winter fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
  55
 
 
 
 
Figure C5. VNRS Spring fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure C6. VNRS Summer fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
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Figure C7. VNRS Fall fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
 
Figure C8. VNRS Winter fast transport probability field within the boundary layer 
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APPENDIX D: Tables 
Data for Typical Transport Time Fields for the Kamchatka and 
Vladivostok NRSs
  58
 
Table D1:  Date for the Typical Transport Time from the Kamchaka NRS (Spring) 
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Table D2:  Date for the Typical Transport Time from the Kamchaka NRS (Summer) 
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Table D3. Date for the typical transport time from the Kamchatka NRS (Fall) 
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Table D4. Data for the typical transport time from the Kamchatka NRS (Winter) 
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Table D5. Data for the typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS (Spring) 
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Table D6. Data for the typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS (Summer) 
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Table D7. Data for the typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS (Fall) 
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Table D8. Data for the typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS (Winter) 
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Table D9. Data for the typical transport time from the Kamchatka NRS (Year) 
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Table D10. Data for the typical transport time from the Vladivostok 
NRS (Year) 
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APPENDIX E:Software Visualization Tools 
Trajectory visualization was done using NCAR Graphics (developed by 
University Corporation for Atmospheric Research Foundation, http://ngwww.ucar.edu/ ) 
and General Mapping Tools, GMT (developed by P.Wessel & W.Smith, 
http://gmt.soest.hawaii.edu/ ) software. We performed cluster analysis of trajectories 
using SAS software (developed by SAS Institute Inc., http://www.sas.com/) and 
programs for analysis were written in SAS language. Probabilistic fields were 
constructed using MATLAB software (developed by MathWorks Inc., 
http://www.mathworks.com/), which includes the geographical mapping toolbox. The 
isentropic trajectory model was modified using FORTRAN-77 and 90 languages. Some 
blocks for model and statistical data analysis were developed in FORTRAN, SAS, 
MATLAB, and C++. 
Visualization of the probabilistic fields for airflow and fast transport we 
combined for both NRSs – Vladivostok and Kamchatka - into a software application. 
This application can be executed from the MATLAB command line (by typing the 
command “farecs” and pressing the “Enter” key). It will create a menu which contains 
several buttons, two of which are airflow and another two – fast transport fields for the 
nuclear risk sites. Select a button to visualize a probabilistic field and press it. Each 
shown probabilistic field is presented using isolines, given with an interval of 5-10%, on 
the background of the geographical maps. To run this application User should follow 
menu items shown below.  
The “*ColorMap”-menu provides a variety of color background pallettes for 
isolines: jet, bone, copper, cool, gray, hsv, hot, pink, spring, summer, and winter. The “* 
Resolution”-menu has three options allowing the choice of the interpolation of the 
original data into various grids. It has resolutions of 2.5°  x 2.5° , 1.25°  x 1.25° , and 
0.625°  x 0.625 °  degrees latitude vs. longitude. The “* GridDomain”-menu also has 
three options. It gives three areas of research interest, which are limited by chosen 
boundaries. These boundaries are slightly different for each NRS, but all of them show 
regional, FARECS study, and large scale domains. 
The probabilistic fields are presented by the “*Season” and “*Month”-menus. 
The first menu includes probabilistic fields calculated for the boundary layer during 
summer, fall, winter, and spring, as well as a year. The second menu consists of 
monthly probabilistic fields. Each time, when User chooses an option in the “*Season” 
and “*Month”-menus, application will be running and re-drawing a probabilistic field. 
The visualization Matlab-oriented software tool had been saved at the RAD 
FARECS CD. It also includes monthly and seasonal variations of the airflow and fast 
transport patterns for both sites for the FARECS and regional domain scales. 
